Author	SHA1	Message	Date
pat-s	f3984f337d	fix(ci): authenticate uvr's GitHub resolution in the index workflows (#204) ... ## Why The post-backfill re-index (12257) reported failure. Five slots could not write their indexes: ``` WARN Failed to fetch git Remote pat-s/cranlike@s3 (GitHub API error: 403 Forbidden); falling back to registry resolution ! Attempt 1/3 to update PACKAGES failed (unused argument (built = built)). Retrying in 5s... Error: Failed to update PACKAGES after 3 attempts. Last error: unused argument (built = built) ``` uvr resolves bincraft's dependencies through the GitHub API, including the `pat-s/cranlike@s3` fork. Unauthenticated, that is rate limited. uvr does not fail on the 403 — it **warns and falls back to the registry copy of cranlike**, which has no `built` parameter, so `update_PACKAGES(built = ...)` dies three retries later. Affected: alpine323, rhel8, rhel9, rhel10, noble. The remaining 13 slots resolved the fork fine and indexed correctly, which is what makes this insidious: the same pipeline passes or fails on identical input depending on the rate-limit window. `build-all-versions.yaml` and `rebuild-abi-gap.yaml` already pass `GITHUB_PAT`, which is why they were never affected. ## What changed Adds the `GITHUB_PAT` secret to `reindex.yaml`, `weekly-rebuild-reindex.yaml` and `backfill-flat-safety.yaml`, with a comment recording why its absence is quiet rather than loud. `crow lint` passes on all three. ## Context The re-index itself did what it was meant to. Drops per per-minor index fell from ~1800-2200 to: ``` 4.4: avg 129 4.5: avg 172 4.6: avg 145 ``` so the per-object safety verdicts recovered roughly 93% of the coverage while still dropping every object that genuinely cannot load. This PR is about the five slots that never got to apply it. Reviewed-on: #204	2026-09-05 15:59:16 +00:00
pat-s	c216e44578	feat(abi): backfill per-object flat-slot safety verdicts (#202) ... ## Why bincraft #128 lets `union_index_records()` keep a carried flat record when that specific object is recorded safe. On its own it changes nothing for the records already being dropped, because they are legacy objects with no verdict: ``` 4.4: 16398 dropped across 9 indexes (~1822 each) 4.5: 20076 dropped across 9 indexes (~2230 each) 4.6: 15532 dropped across 9 indexes (~1726 each) ``` Every one of those resolves to CRAN source for clients the routing serves correctly. This backfill inspects the objects already in the bucket and writes their verdicts, which is what actually restores the coverage. ## How the verdict is made By symbols, not heuristics. A binary fails at `dyn.load()` under minor M exactly when it references a symbol M does not export, and the volatile set is derived by diffing the `libR.so` exports of the R builds installed in the image — so a new R release updates it with no curated list to maintain. That matters here because the source-level classifier calls **93%** of compiled packages risky (`LinkingTo: Rcpp` alone is enough), while a symbol scan of the same slot found **17** packages that break under 4.6 and **72** under 4.4. Recording the real answer per object is what makes the difference between ~2000 dropped records and the few dozen that genuinely need dropping. ## Safety - **Refuses to run where fewer than two R minors are installed.** With nothing to compare, every verdict would read "safe" — writing a bucket full of false clearances is far worse than writing none. - Skips packages with no compiled code: they cannot fail this way and are never dropped, so downloading them to prove it is wasted. - Resumable; already-recorded objects cost one query. `crow lint` passes. ## Sequencing Merge and release bincraft #128 first, then run this per slot, then re-index. Verifying the drop counts fall is the point of the exercise, so that re-index is where the fix is confirmed rather than assumed. Reviewed-on: #202	2026-09-05 09:35:47 +00:00