Author	SHA1	Message	Date
pat-s	68c3b6e66e	fix(abi): prune the objects recorded broken, not every risky package ... The prune selected its targets with `abi_cache_risky_packages()`, the source classifier. A dry run on ubuntu-2404-amd64 reports what that costs: Dry run: 3013 object(s) left in place. The classifier calls 93% of compiled packages risky; the binaries' own symbols say 4.3%. Applying it would have deleted roughly 3000 working flat objects to fix about 230 broken ones, turning every one of them into a source fallback for clients that cannot be routed. Select from `abi_flat_safety` instead, matching the object rather than the package name: a package can have a safe flat binary at one version and an unsafe one at another, and deleting both throws away a working binary. This is the same correction #129 made to the index writer; the prune was written before the verdicts existed and never followed. The refusal guard moves with it. An empty result now means the slot's flat-safety backfill never ran, which is exactly the state rhel8 was found in, and pruning nothing while reporting success would have hidden it.	2026-09-09 13:06:05 +00:00
pat-s	f9ebb3dba4	fix(abi): prune flat-slot binaries of ABI-risky packages (#200) ... ## Why `base64enc` still fails to install under R 4.6 even after it was built into the 4.6 slot: ``` base64enc.so: undefined symbol: SETLENGTH ``` The per-minor binary is correct and serves correctly to any client the router can identify. But the **flat slot still holds a binary built under R 4.4.3**, and that is what every client receives when it cannot be routed by R minor. That object should not exist. `upload_single_binary()` writes an ABI-risky package only to the per-minor path: ```r if (is_r_minor_sensitive) { remote_tarball_path <- file.path(remote_bin_path, minor_version, tarball_name) } else { remote_tarball_path <- file.path(remote_bin_path, tarball_name) } ``` `base64enc`'s flat binary is a legacy artifact from before it was classified risky. Removing it makes the outcome correct regardless of routing, user agent, downloader or renv configuration, which is the part I could not otherwise guarantee. ## What it does `local/prune-stale-flat-binaries.R` lists a slot's flat objects, intersects them with the risky set, and deletes them. Deleting is safe here: the source fallback republishes the CRAN source under the same key, so the package stays installable everywhere and compiles against the client's own R, while routed clients keep getting the per-minor binary. Safety posture, given this deletes production objects: - **dry run by default**; nothing is removed without `--apply` - takes an **explicit package list**, so the first runs need not trust the classifier cache at all - **refuses to proceed on an empty risky set**, which is indistinguishable from an unreachable cache and would otherwise report success having pruned nothing - **keeps objects whose package CRAN no longer ships**, since there would be no source to fall back to and the package would vanish - **re-indexes and purges in the same run**. This is not optional: a published index naming deleted files serves 404s, which is worse than the binary it replaced. ## Use ```sh # dry run first crow pipeline create devxy/build-cran-binaries \ --var prune_flat=ubuntu-2604-amd64 --var PRUNE_PACKAGES="base64enc lobstr" # then apply crow pipeline create devxy/build-cran-binaries \ --var prune_flat=ubuntu-2604-amd64 --var PRUNE_PACKAGES="base64enc lobstr" \ --var PRUNE_APPLY=yes ``` `crow lint` passes. ## Sequencing Run with an explicit list first, on one slot, and confirm the flat URL then serves source while the per-minor URLs still serve binaries. Only widen to the cache-derived set once the backfill has finished and its output looks sane: the first 250 classifications came back 232 r-minor-sensitive, and a rate that high suggests the source-grep classifier is broader than the set that actually breaks, which is worth checking before pruning thousands of flat binaries. Reviewed-on: #200	2026-09-04 10:54:09 +00:00